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even in critical circumstances. All warnings made in advance by research 
institutes and monitoring organizations were disregarded.  Besides alienation 
mentioned above, there is one more explanation of weakness of power. ‘Or-
ganizations that had been rational and efficient under normal dynamics of 
nature were now having great  difficulty coping with its extreme movements. 
The severe weather exposed modern society as fragile. Previously, nature 
has seemed reduced to benign recreation, but now it appeared threatening 
and filled with danger’. (Murphy, 2010: 88-89). Only some king of busi-
nesses celebrated because the prices for all could make cool – ventilators, 
conditioners, sun-screens and the like – jumping up every day. 
As to academics, they divided in two parts. A majority of professors and 
instructors of high schools (with their children and relatives) simply run 
away from zones of fire and smog, and calmly continued their relaxation 
abroad. Only by the command from the top some of them as well as regional 
and local executives were forced to return to suffering cities and towns. On 
the contrary, the minority of academics, mainly involved in nature protec-
tion, took part in aid and rescue operations at once. They worked not only as 
consultants or experts, but did any rescue work which was needed in a par-
ticular place. As I confirmed empirically, the old tradition of Russian scien-
tists khozdenie v narod (going to people) had been revitalized (Yanitsky, 
2005). But there is another explanation of their activity: many of them had 
bought dachas (shale) in devastated rural villages, and therefore they de-
fended from fires not only a common good but their private property. 
 
8. On shortcomings of rescue operations 
Since we, sociologists, had been insiders and practiced bottom—up view, 
some deficits and mistakes of official organizations responsible for rescue 
became clearly seen. Firstly, the impact on political and economic processes 
underline a disaster had been not investigated (for example, a local adminis-
tration functions or building materials). Rescue organizers first looking at the 
aid operation itself. Then, the rescuers has no a rehabilitation program. Their 
operations were restricted by prevention fire of houses of local inhabitants, 
only. There were no programs of their further security, food supply, etc. 
They did not know the state of art of targeted population before the begin-
ning of disaster and aid intervention. Neither municipal authorities nor res-
cuers did not know how many people were actually needed in aid and medi-
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cal help, because some of residents left their homes before fire. It may be 
said that the state bodies have no models and the least idea on the forthcom-
ing disaster, its scope, timing, pace, probable character of damages as well as 
on how to cope with it.   
Furthermore, the authorities has no idea what must be done (secured) first of 
all and what  can wait till Spring (Summer, etc). Then it is a problem of neg-
lecting long-term effect of disaster. Rescues returned to their barracks and 
who will plan and implement of people, settlement and nature rehabilitation? 
I share the view of Keen that  not consulting of end-user is a serious prob-
lem. The voice of victims only rare comes through the evaluations made by 
officials. Calling victims or end-users ‘beneficiaries’ tends to pre-empt the 
crucial question or whether they have indeed benefited. 
The next common failing in evaluations of a disaster consequences is that the 
sociologists and rescuers, being outsiders, not asking relevant questions to 
victims of disaster. For example, they were usually never asked about plans 
on their immediate and more distant future. As our investigation showed the 
situation is 50: 50. One half has no plan to resettle, the other dreams to leave 
their settlement for ever. 
I agree with Keen that problems of timing is very acute. Insofar as evalua-
tions are carried out  at the end of the project (whether this is development or 
relief), there will be few opportunities for putting right problems as they 
arise. The temptation is for donors to take minimal responsibility for imple-
mentation a complicated set of rehabilitation measures. Donors prefer simply 
to decide at the end of a rescue operation ‘whether the implementing partners 
performed well or badly. And the final related problem centers on who is 
evaluating whom. Some aid workers have stressed that  a proper evaluation 
should be a “two-way street”: there should be opportunities for recipients to 
evaluate donors as well as the other way round.’ (Keen, 2008: 158-9). Do-
nors and rescue organization welcomed to use resources of local people, but 
never involved them in planning of rescue operations and their evaluations. 
 
9. Conclusions  
 Biophysical ‘events undermine assumptions of safety and mastery of nature’ 
(Murphy, 2010: 15). Nature defined the rescue structure of civil rescuers 
activities and stimulates the emergence of multiple ‘spots’ of activity far 
